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Abstract—We recount in this essay the decade-long story of 
Gram Vaani, a social enterprise with a vision to build 
appropriate ICTs (Information and Communication 
Technologies) for participatory media in rural and low-income 
settings, to bring about social development and community 
empowerment. Other social enterprises will relate to the learning 
gained and the strategic pivots that Gram Vaani had to 
undertake to survive and deliver on its mission, while searching 
for a robust financial sustainability model. While we believe the 
ideal model still remains elusive, we conclude this essay with an 
open question about the reason to differentiate between different 
kinds of enterprises – commercial or social, for-profit or not-for-
profit – and argue that all enterprises should have an ethical 
underpinning to their work.  
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I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Name of Venture: Gram Vaani – http://gramvaani.org   
Age of Venture: 10+ years 
Size: 70+ full time employees 
Management team: Vijay Sai Pratap, Aaditeshwar Seth 
Location: India 
Form of incorporation: For-profit company 
Incubator affiliation: IIT Delhi 
Venture fund pipeline: Approximately $600K raised in equity 
investment from the Media Development Investment Fund and 
the Indian Angel Network 
A. Problem addressed 
Participatory media on the Internet has empowered people 
by giving them the ability to share knowledge and express 
themselves openly. Rural and low-income communities in 
developing regions are however unable to leverage digital 
participatory media networks for various reasons, including 
issues of literacy (both educational and technological), 
affordability of technologies such as smartphones and the 
Internet, and infrastructure readiness in remote areas. How can 
these communities be provided with information services 
despite these challenges? 
B. Role of technology 
Gram Vaani operates voice-based participatory media 
networks through a variety of technology platforms, including 
community radio [1, 2], IVR (Interactive Voice Response) 
systems [3, 4, 5], and mobile apps. The use of voice makes the 
platforms accessible to even poorly literate people, and 
community radio and IVR systems do not require Internet 
access either. Gram Vaani’s innovation lies in using these 
simple technologies to build interactive systems that enable 
people to create and share their own media in voice.  
Several impact pathways have evolved through the use of 
this technology. Information created by the people in a bottom-
up manner tends to be more contextual, and improves the 
knowledge and awareness of the local community [6, 7]. 
Conversations on the platform about social norms not 
discussed otherwise leads to an introspection of the issues by 
the community members, and results in attitude and behavior 
change [5]. Being able to talk about governance and civic 
issues on an open platform helps hold powerful stakeholders in 
check and increases the social accountability of government 
officials [4]. A specific focus on creating a space for 
marginalized groups to share their thoughts is extremely 
empowering for them, especially in a context where such 
groups have historically been suppressed [8]. Finally, the 
platforms also provide opportunities for community building 
through cultural expression, entertainment, and humour [9]. 
C. Impact measurement 
Over 500,000 users of different Gram Vaani platforms have 
benefited from socially useful information on health, nutrition, 
agriculture, livelihood, etc (shown 15-25% improvement in 
awareness indicators). Over 100,000 users have been directly 
impacted through improved delivery of government schemes 
and services in their villages and colonies. Over 2,000,000 
users have benefited from access to hyperlocal news and 
information about their communities. 
D. Learning outcomes 
A broad structure is outlined in the following sections, to 
touch upon our learning our the years at three levels: The 
strategic challenges of running an enterprise, decisions about 
alignment with a market based approach or other channels for 
financial sustainability, and finally some critical reflections for 
the future. 
II. STRATEGIC CHALLENGES OF RUNNING AN ENTERPRISE 
We start with recounting a history of Gram Vaani to set the 
context. Back in 2007, we were deeply inspired with the 
success that participatory media had seen in facilitating 
collective action and governance improvement in developed 
regions [10, 11], and wanted to find appropriate solutions that 
could be applied to developing regions where a straightforward 
transfer of Internet-based participatory media systems would 
not be suitable [12]. At the same time, we were also cognizant 
of the poor credibility assurance provided on participatory 
media platforms [13], and wanted to find a design that would 
be both participatory as well as able to ensure credible 
communication. Community radio seemed to be a perfect fit 
here, and in 2006 India had just announced its new community 
radio policy permitting non-academic institutions to set up 
their stations [14], hence it seemed like an ideal medium poised 
for rapid growth.  
Community radio (CR) is a broadcast form of audio-based 
media, telecast over radiowaves within a radius of 10-15km, 
with a practice to create local participation in both content 
development and consumption [15]. These stations are often 
setup in an economical manner, as a two room setup with one 
room serving as a content editing and management office space 
and the other as a recording plus interviewing studio [16]. The 
studio is sound-proofed in rudimentary ways using egg-trays 
mounted on walls and thick curtains on the windows. A 
barebones set of recording equipment consisting of a couple of 
tripod-mounted microphones in the office, and portable 
recorders for the field, are used along with a few computers 
running open-source or even pirated versions of audio editing 
software. The FM transmitter and antenna tower generally 
form the largest capital expenditure for the stations. These 
stations are set up by academic or non-academic non-profit 
organizations, with a commitment to make the programming 
inclusive and embedded into the local community. Staff and 
volunteers from the neighbourhood are trained on audio 
content production, conducting interviews, coverage of local 
events, etc [17]. The community is also mobilized to form 
listener groups to tune-in to the radio broadcasts and discuss 
the messages. Content needs are determined locally based on 
what is relevant, with programmes on agricultural advisory, 
health, education, livelihood, folk songs and entertainment, 
civic issues, local governance, and other topics [18].  
CR stations seemed like an ideal medium to bring 
participatory media to developing regions, being both 
participatory in their operations, and with editorial controls to 
ensure credibility of information. As technologists, after 
conducting several interactions with stations in India and other 
countries, we were able to come up with design needs for a 
technology solution to make the stations more participatory 
and efficient in their operations [1]. The stations seemed to 
need an automation system to archive their broadcasts for 
regulatory compliance, index their content for search and 
retrieval in the future, stream their content online so that 
listeners and other stakeholders including donors could listen 
to the content without physically being in the broadcast station, 
and most importantly, leverage the increasing penetration of 
mobile phones to enable listeners to call the station to record 
their messages, go live on air, talk to an expert over a live 
conversation, and send and receive SMSes. Such systems 
existed commercially, but were too expensive to be deployed 
by small non-profit community groups [19]. Based on a 
proposal written towards the end of 2007, we won a grant in 
2008 to build an open-source radio automation system that 
could be deployed at CR stations [20].  
Further, we realized that CR stations faced a constant 
challenge of financing their operational expenses. Initial seed 
grants for capital expenditure and training were able to get the 
stations started, but operational expenses for staff salaries, 
equipment upgradation, local travel, etc was an unsolved 
challenge. To address this challenge, we envisioned also 
fulfilling the role of an aggregation platform where we could 
position the potentially nationwide network of stations running 
our automation software as a syndication platform to run 
advertisements and sponsored campaigns at a very large scale 
[21]. Individually it was hard for the stations to market 
themselves to companies and governments for advertising 
revenue to reach remote markets, but positioning it as a 
network we felt could potentially make it more marketable.  
Our funding proposal was therefore situated around two 
objectives [20]. First, to build a radio automation system for 
CR stations to help them improve their operational efficiency 
and community engagement. Second, to build a social 
entrepreneurial business model that would raise advertising 
revenue from large companies and government departments 
keen to reach remote regions, and share this revenue with the 
stations to finance their operational expenses.  
However, while our automation product GRINS (Gramin 
Radio Inter Networking System) released in 2009 was very 
successful as an appropriate technology solution, our business 
model did not work out due to external market factors beyond 
our control. The government which had earlier sounded 
extremely bullish about having more than 4,000 CR stations 
around the country, turned out to be slow and demanding in 
granting licenses for new CR stations. Many non-profit 
organizations applying for a license had to wait for several 
years for their application to get vetted. Further, even the small 
capital requirements for economical CR station setups was not 
easy to raise by the non-profit organizations, most funding 
being sectorally aligned rather than towards a broad media 
platform that could be used by different sectors. Consequently, 
it was not easy for us to present a large consolidated network to 
advertisers – a fragmented presence with a CR station partner 
here and another one there was not convincing enough for 
advertisers to sign-up.  
After two years of having spent growing the GRINS 
network to more than two dozen stations, we decided to pivot 
to an alternate medium, although still aligned with our mission 
of bringing change through participatory media. We built a 
solution using IVR (Interactive Voice Response) systems, on 
which people could call through their phones and listen to 
audio messages or record their own message [22, 23]. Like 
community radio, this was also geared towards participatory 
content production, but did not require licenses or any heavy 
capital expenditure to operate. Being entirely voice-based, it 
could be accessed even by less literate people. Further, the cost 
of using the system could be flexibly shifted either to the users 
to pay or call, or to the organization to run it in a toll-free 
manner so that users could use it at no cost. A backend web-
based system allowed content managers to create and upload 
their content to be heard on the IVR, or review the content 
submitted by users and decide whether to publish it on the IVR 
or not. This system called vAutomate was extended over the 
years with different applications, such as a discussion forum 
application as described above where users could listen to or 
record audio content, a customizable data collection survey 
application, a case management application to create cases and 
track the progress made on them, and a helpline application to 
talk live to a manual operator.  
vAutomate was received very well by social development 
organizations working across different sectors including 
education, health, agriculture, livelihood, governance, etc. 
These organizations often had a wide footprint over which they 
worked and hence the limited geographic reach of CR stations 
was not adequate for them. They also did not have the time to 
go through a CR station licensing process. Further, being 
sectorally aligned themselves, they could choose to use the 
IVR technology specifically for the use-case in which they 
were interested. We saw several small projects coming up, 
ranging from the use of IVR systems to host content for parents 
about how they could participate in the education of their 
children, to collection of grievances from urban communities 
about civic issues, peer-to-peer and expert-based question-
answering programmes in agriculture, etc. We envisioned our 
business model as potentially staying the same, where we 
would make some revenue through the use of our technology 
by different partners, and some revenue by running aggregated 
advertising on the network of IVR instances and CR stations.  
As we got deeper into the social sector and began to work 
with a range of partners, we however realized some new 
challenges in this space that had become well recognized by 
now as ICTD (Information and Communication Technologies 
for Development) [24]. We saw that for the social sector 
partners to utilize our technology solutions depended a lot on 
their internal capacity. Some were not able to envision strong 
use-cases for the technology. Some of them who did, 
sometimes did not have the capacity to shift the functions that 
they were currently executing manually to running these 
functions on the IVR platform. Some of them had not 
anticipated the effort it would take to create good quality audio 
content, or to guide and mentor users to record good quality 
audio content, or to even learn to use IVR systems. We saw 
many projects ending up as failures in our view, from an 
impact realization standpoint. Such projects had certainly been 
impactful to define new use-cases, provide experience to the 
social sector partners in using ICTs for development, and 
identify challenges in executing ICTD projects, but due to 
seemingly avoidable issues that did not require re-learning, we 
could not help feeling that we could do better to see more 
impact emerging from our technology innovations.  
Towards the end of 2012, one of our self-funded pilots in 
the state of Jharkhand in using the vAutomate platform for 
citizen-government engagement, was showing strong promise 
in emerging as an impactful community empowerment 
platform [25]. We were working closely with a right-based 
community organization who would encourage people to 
record problems that they were facing with government 
schemes, and the organization would then take up these issues 
to the concerned officials. These issues included grievances on 
wage payment delays in government programmes, poor 
delivery quality of education and health services, non-redressal 
of civic infrastructural complaints for electricity and water, etc. 
Upon hearing such problems recorded on a publicly accessible 
communication platform, many of the problems saw 
accelerated redressal by government officials. The community 
based organization also had a deep field presence among 
highly marginalized groups who did not know how to even use 
basic technologies like IVR systems, and this taught us the 
importance of offline training and mentoring of the users for 
effective use of the technology. Seeing this strong impact, a 
significant shift upon which we decided this year was to 
reinvent ourselves from not being just a technology provider in 
the ICTD space, but to grow this pilot by taking on the end-to-
end role of running the participatory media platform ourselves.  
We raised an equity investment during 2013 to 2015 
around this idea from impact investors, to build a participatory 
media platform we called Mobile Vaani, in which we would 
create our own userbase, manage the content ourselves, and 
build our own institutional partnerships. Like before, we would 
bring financial sustainability through revenues from 
advertising and sponsored content hosted on the platform, but 
unlike the earlier model of being an aggregator of platforms 
run by different partners using our technology, we would run 
the platform ourselves. This marked our transformation of 
moving from a technology company to a media company, and 
thereby required us to build new functional capability 
internally. Over the years, we consequently built a creative 
content creation team, a content moderation team to review 
user generated content, a community mobilization team to 
market the platform and train users to use it, a mandatory 
impact function within the community team, and a business 
development team to sell advertising and social campaigns on 
Mobile Vaani. Using the investment, Mobile Vaani soon grew 
to over 30 districts spread across three states of Jharkhand, 
Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh, won several awards about its 
unique technology-based participatory media model, and was 
mentioned in several lists of innovative startups and social 
enterprises in India and the world [26]. Organizationally it was 
a tumultuous phase for the team in formalizing many informal 
processes, learning to share insights across role-based 
segregations that began to emerge, meet customer requirements 
and investor expectations, etc.  
We will pick up the thread later for the period beyond 
2013, and next reflect on this history to mention some key 
learning which are likely to be shared with many other 
enterprises built around technology innovations. 
A. Ecosystem induced pivoting 
We started with working in the community radio space, but 
the market was not growing fast enough due to slow licensing 
policies of the government for setting up of new community 
radio stations. This was in turn constraining our own growth, 
and two years later we pivoted to an IVR based model for 
participatory media. Similar experiences have been noted with 
other ICTs where the policy environment may not have been 
conducive enough at the time or other barriers may have 
existed in the ecosystem. The use of drones for drug delivery in 
remote areas [27], and the use of spectrum whitespaces for 
remote connectivity [28], are examples of the former, where 
regulatory caution may have led to slow market growth. It is 
possible that the challenges we encountered in the slow pace of 
growth of the CR sector may have also been an effect of 
regulatory caution on part of the government to not suddenly 
have lots of autonomous radio stations begin to broadcast 
content outside of the government control. Another example is 
that of telecenters [29], where either some parts of the 
technology stack such as network connectivity were not robust 
enough for rapid scaling at the time, or a standardized financial 
sustainability model was non-contextually thrust upon village 
level entrepreneurs by the government, and resulted in slow or 
unreliable impact due to ecosystem induced externalities. 
Enterprises can therefore be expected to pivot due to these 
external challenges. 
B. Impatience induced pivoting 
We found that selling technology to organizations that do 
not have a culture of using technology, can not only be slow 
and time-taking, but the ability of the organization to utilize the 
technology to its potential depends a lot on their own internal 
capacity and creativity. We saw several of our projects not 
leading to substantial impact, and ultimately pivoted to start 
our own participatory media network instead of helping other 
organizations to set up their networks which we could 
aggregate. Although we are not able to immediately think of 
other examples in the social entrepreneurial space that may 
have gone through a similar phase, some parallels can be 
drawn with organizational strategies followed by companies 
like Amazon and Netflix. They started as marketplaces to 
connect consumers with producers of goods, or content, but 
have now moved strongly into content production themselves 
[30]. Probably they saw gaps in the content needs of consumers 
that were not being met by the traditional content producers, or 
they wanted to step into the competition themselves, but this is 
another example of pivoting that enterprises may have to do to 
remain relevant. 
C. Going beyond technology 
We saw that technology alone cannot bring change, it needs 
supporting pillars around it to nurture its use, guide the users, 
build services on top of the technology, create institutional 
linkages to run these services well, etc [3, 31, 32]. Once we 
started our own participatory media network, we had to quickly 
expand our team to bring in content specialists, community 
mobilization experience, and programme design, to support the 
technology so that it could support the users to use it 
meaningfully. We realize now that such a diversification 
beyond technology is not new in the social enterprise space. 
Social enterprises by definition operate in markets which are 
not well established, unlike the space occupied by commercial 
enterprises where substantial functional segregation already 
exists. For example, if somebody wants to start a new 
magazine publication for educated urban readers in India, 
online or offline, then a rich ecosystem already exists of 
marketing channels to publicize the magazine, networks of 
columnists who can write for the magazine, advertisers who 
are looking for new publications to reach out to niche 
audiences, etc. On the other hand, for a similar initiative in 
rural markets, Mobile Vaani had to create all these functions 
internally. Similarly, we have come across many other 
fascinating social enterprises, such as those creating dairy 
farmer collectives [33], serving information nuggets to farmers 
[34], marketing health products for low-income populations 
[35], etc, all of whom were operating in nascent market 
ecosystems and had to innovatively diversify beyond their core 
technology offering. 
III. ORGANIZATIONAL ORIENTATIONS FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
We next pick up the thread about how the Mobile Vaani 
business strategy has evolved since 2013, and continues to 
evolve, in search of a financial sustainability model for 
participatory media platforms for rural and low-income users. 
Although written from the perspective of financing 
participatory media, the discussion will reveal patterns about 
the pros and cons of choosing different approaches to create 
social good: market based, non-profit and charitable, or 
government driven. 
A. Context of impact investing and a market driven approach 
Although the Mobile Vaani model of running the 
participatory media platform ourselves, gave us a lot of 
flexibility and focus in bringing substantial impact, the 
advertising centred business model required equity investment 
to make the network large enough so that it could begin to 
attract strong advertising revenues. A small network would not 
appear attractive enough to large advertisers. Further, brands 
were still not convinced of taking a digital marketing approach 
for rural markets. As mentioned earlier, we raised an equity 
investment during 2013-15 to grow the network, but we have 
been unable to raise a follow-up impact investment since then. 
It took us many years but this experience has made us realize a 
few things about impact investing.  
One, we realized that impact investors are exactly what the 
words mean – they are investors! They invest financial capital, 
they operate in financial markets, and they expect financial 
returns. This guides each and every decision that they make. 
They are patient, no doubt, and we are thankful to them for it. 
However, they will only invest in an enterprise if there is a 
clear pathway for financial returns, the scale and the nature of 
social impact seems to be of secondary importance to them 
[36]. Two, impact investors are quite risk averse. The volume 
of capital that they work with, hardly allows for any risk. This, 
combined with the first point, therefore makes them gravitate 
towards investing in sectors where successful businesses have 
already been operating, be it schools or hospitals or even 
money lending, thus keeping their experimental risk low [37]. 
They put in money to create similar new businesses, or to bring 
in existing businesses into the formal economy, so that the 
enterprises can draw upon new financial capital and expand. 
This seems to have been the driving force behind MFIs, or 
social enterprises that operate rural health clinics, or private 
school chains, in having been able to raise impact investment – 
all of these businesses were operating in some form or another, 
and the investment only helped formalize these businesses to 
draw more external capital.  
Our model of creating a participatory media platform with a 
promise of revenues in the future, seems to have appeared too 
risky to impact investors [38]. Commercial investors of course 
invest in these models, which are just like Facebook or Twitter, 
and possibly have a greater appetite for funding businesses that 
are creating new markets. Ironically, we have seen commercial 
investments happening in news and media based enterprises 
that are not focused on impact at all, but who cater to meet 
entertainment and self-expression needs of the more up-market 
segment of people in small towns than of marginalized groups 
who actually need more support [39].  
This brings us to another dilemma that has surfaced for us 
in this market driven economy. As a for-profit equity 
investment driven organization, we soon found the winning 
formula to rapidly expand our userbase at low costs: 
Hyperlocal news contributed regularly by our team of local 
volunteers and community reporters, was in great demand and 
quickly expanded the userbase. However we realized that this 
formula works reliably only for young men living closer to the 
urban peripheries, and who already are economically well off. 
It was not only more costly to reach women users, or poorer 
families that rely on government schemes, but also their 
information needs seemed to be more complex than 
straightforward reporting of local news. We therefore faced a 
question of how much resources should we spend for this 
userbase that arguably needs our services more desperately but 
is more expensive to service [3, 31, 32]. Similarly, being able 
to support this marginalized userbase to get their rights and 
entitlements under different government schemes, and to 
improve the quality of public and private services availed by 
them, has brought us a lot of social credibility but it required 
additional effort and hence incurred an additional cost [4]. This 
raises a question that should we attempt to build social 
credibility just because we define our vision that way, or is 
building social credibility also important commercially in a 
market based economy to gain user trust, and if it is then how 
much effort should we spend on it?  
Note that we have not even touched upon other problems of 
advertising funded media such as the advertisers being able to 
influence our agenda. The concerns we have raised are more 
basic. It remains questionable whether advertising can even 
become a revenue driver for a participatory media platform that 
is aimed at rural and low-income communities [40], and if it 
can then will impact investors be willing to take a bet to try it 
out? Should a for-profit social enterprise spend its resources to 
include harder to reach users, or should it constrain itself to the 
readily accessible users who seem to be better off economically 
and also of more interest to advertisers? These aspects point 
towards the need to reflect on what kind of social problems or 
demographics are likely to gain benefit through market based 
approaches, and which pockets may get ignored.  
The two questions we have raised of the kind of enterprises 
that impact investors seem to be comfortable with, and the kind 
of users that for-profit social enterprises may choose to target, 
are likely to have surfaced for other social enterprises as well. 
Stories abound such as how farmer collectives working with 
marginalized tribal groups are unable to raise investment 
because of their focus on lower income segments and longer 
time to returns [41], or how innovations in agricultural 
technology to improve productivity are geared towards large 
farmers only [42]. This shows that market-based approaches to 
address social development problems may not be a silver bullet 
at all, leaving room for other approaches.  
We want to add that we have not approached commercial 
investors as yet, because they do not seem to be interested in 
the kind of target users that we are reaching out to, and they 
have also been drawn into the rapidly changing technological 
landscape of smartphones with digital access leaving the 
perception that voice-based solutions especially built on IVR 
systems are outdated. We have recently completed the 
development of a Mobile Vaani app as well, with evidence of 
good traction from the users, and we plan to explore this route 
via commercial investors with a simple user traction based 
pitch with no mention of impact. 
B. Role of philanthropy 
With the Mobile Vaani model stuck in a catch-22 situation 
of not being large enough to attract substantial advertising 
revenue, and not able to raise more capital for expansion to 
become attractive enough for the advertisers, interestingly 
Gram Vaani has survived through philanthropic grants that use 
the Mobile Vaani model within different sectors [43, 44, 45]. 
Programmes funded for social-sector partners to use the 
Mobile Vaani model, or directly to Gram Vaani to set up new 
platforms for sector-specific objectives, have brought much 
needed revenues that have sustained the organization and also 
the core Mobile Vaani programme although at a slightly 
diminished scale. The diverse experience gained by the team 
beyond just the technology development as a result of running 
Mobile Vaani, has been crucial to execute these programmes 
with much better success rates than earlier because we are now 
able to support the partners more extensively on non-
technological functions as well, including on content 
development, community training, and use-case identification.  
Due to the sectoral nature of funding in the social 
development space, although Mobile Vaani has not been able 
to raise enough grants to do participatory media itself, even this 
sectorally focused model of funding for health or gender or 
other programmes has been extremely helpful. It has enabled 
us to continue making valuable technology enhancements and 
process improvements, since the underlying technology 
platform and operational model is the same as that used for 
Mobile Vaani. The downside however is that we are hardly 
able to pay attention to Mobile Vaani and the crucial 
governance-improvement function that it has been serving, 
because operating as a services organization brings various 
overheads not necessarily aligned with the original vision of 
participatory media that we started out with. Most of our 
funded programmes have been in the space of health, gender 
rights, financial literacy, etc, with very little on governance, 
although that was one of the key reasons for us to start working 
in this space. Similarly, in most programmes we have worked 
to support partner teams on the ground, and have not been able 
to replicate the successful models of volunteer collectives that 
we developed on Mobile Vaani [31]. Although it is revenues 
from these programmes that ultimately enable us to keep 
Mobile Vaani running, the programmes now occupy the bulk 
of our time and mindspace.  
It is important to note though that as compared to market-
based approaches, donors are indeed keen to reach the most 
marginalized populations which are not considered attractive 
by the market as ideal consumers. This is an upside that has 
helped us retain a focus on rural and low-income communities, 
and avoid getting sucked into the market driven vortex that 
gravitates naturally towards seeing eligible users as those who 
are consumers with disposable income. This also points 
towards the need to recognize that different user segments may 
be serviced through different approaches: Market-based 
approaches for those economically well-off, and grant-funded 
approaches for poorer people.  
There are caveats though in the long term sustainability of 
philanthropic funding in ICTD. A lot of these ICTD 
programmes are actually classified as innovation projects, that 
often aim to use new methods (through the use of technology) 
to tackle known problems. The concept of innovation itself has 
been argued to having emerged as a means to counter the 
hegemony of markets, and even of the state in some cases [46]. 
However the succession to any successful innovation is to 
transition to a scale-up of the innovation, which can come only 
from either the markets or the state. This is an inherent 
contradiction in the approach of many philanthropists, who 
want to amplify the impact of their investment through the very 
same means that gave rise to the need for the innovation in the 
first place. Such a setup then leads to mismatched incentives to 
displace existing systems, something that is very difficult when 
dealing with the state. As an example, we successfully piloted 
two exciting projects related to governance, and in both we 
engaged closely with the government, but neither was adopted 
by the state for scale-up. The first was a system that provided 
voice-based notifications to workers on a national employment 
rights programme for when their wages were disbursed, and 
allowed them to dispute it and register a grievance in case of a 
discrepancy [47, 48]. We took the findings to the central 
government who went as far as forming a committee but 
eventually none of the recommendations were taken into 
consideration, with no transparency about the process. The 
second was a system that allowed knowledgeable social 
workers to adopt pending grievances filed by people about 
welfare entitlements, and assist them to fill any documentation 
gaps so that the grievances could be processed [4, 49]. Despite 
strong successes and collaboration from the government in 
doing the pilot, it was not adopted as a standard process. This 
makes us believe that innovations which were conceived in the 
first place to change the status quo, are unlikely to be adopted 
for the same reason that they would change the status quo 
which would not be in the interest of several stakeholders.  
Markets have been better at embracing disruptive 
innovations, but as we have discussed earlier, the markets are 
likely to decide to not service customers who do not have any 
substantial disposable income to be counted as customers in the 
first place. All these factors point towards the need to reflect on 
where grant funds can be deployed in terms of target user 
segments and sectors of focus, as compared to market-based 
approaches, but contradictions still remain in this setup and 
challenge the dominant strategy of philanthropic donors to 
scale their impact through either the state or the market. We 
feel this is an unsolved problem so far. 
C. Government support for media platforms 
We share an excellent relationship with the government for 
the Mobile Vaani platform. The platform commands 
substantial credibility and is regularly used by people to talk 
about problems they face with government schemes and 
services, and our volunteers take up these issues to government 
officials, who often solve them on priority [4]. The officials 
also actively utilize the platform to send announcements to 
people, and hence a strong citizen-government engagement 
relationship is supported through our platforms in a 
collaborative manner with the government [3]. However, as 
mentioned earlier, our proposals to the government to fund 
Mobile Vaani as a participatory media platform aimed at 
improving governance, have not been successful. On the other 
hand, some of our sector specific programmes such as to push 
alerts for better maternal care and child care to families [50, 
51], or to track cases of pregnancy, or methods to collect data 
about activities done by health services staff and cadre [52], 
have been financed by the government. Many of these 
programmes also arose via philanthropic grants that catalysed 
the innovations. This raises a key question about the choice of 
programmes funded by the government – the evidence so far 
points towards the state as being willing to fund programmes in 
low-conflict domains like health, but probably not fund 
programmes that challenge the status quo of governance, or 
programmes that help people to get organized to build stronger 
collectives that might end up challenging the state.  
It is possible that our reading of the failure to get 
government funding for Mobile Vaani may need to be more 
nuanced though. The government does make extensive 
payments to media for announcements about schemes and 
services albeit in a propagandist manner, although they have 
also used this funding channel as a leverage to thwart media 
independence much like many commercial advertisers [53]. 
Our failure to raise funding from the government may therefore 
be related to our positioning of Mobile Vaani as an 
empowerment intervention with an apolitical stance, rather 
than a standard media agency focused on reporting news. 
While we continue to experiment with different angles, we 
want to note that even if government funding were to work out, 
it will not be straightforward to operationalize. Procurement 
norms, decision making punctuated by the vagaries of electoral 
priorities, corruption, etc, are significant challenges that make 
it extremely difficult for small companies to navigate the 
government system. All this points towards being realistic in 
assessing what can be expected from the government in 
supporting media platforms. 
IV. REFLECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
So far in the discussion above, we took a historical 
perspective to document some learning about the pros and cons 
of bringing financial sustainability for Mobile Vaani through 
different organizational orientations – of being market based, 
or donor supported, or government supported. Although our 
discussion has been in the specific context of discovering 
strategies for participatory media networks, these findings 
would generalize to other domains as well. We next reflect on 
the future – the choices we might have going forward, which 
we debate internally each day. 
A. Unanswered questions – the financing of media 
Much of the dilemmas we face about building a financial 
sustainability model for participatory media, are shared with 
the broader media industry in general [54, 55]. Although the 
low level of digital penetration in India has left its media 
industry largely unscathed so far, but across the developed 
world digital content distribution platforms such as Facebook 
have disrupted revenues for content producers. They have 
drawn critical advertising revenue to themselves, leaving the 
content producers to resort to methods like paywalls to sustain 
their operations. This of course constrains the media access to 
those who have the ability to pay for it, likely making it an 
unrealistic approach for platforms like Mobile Vaani that are 
intended to be used by even more marginalized low-income 
groups. We are toying with the idea of community 
subscriptions, or financial support provided by local collectives 
such as women SHG networks or trade unions, where it can be 
justified that Mobile Vaani is not just providing a participatory 
media service but also tangible outcomes such as through 
volunteer driven grievance redressal mechanisms or 
establishing collective bargaining arrangements [56, 57, 58]. 
Additionally, we are contemplating crowd-funded programmes 
where wealthy individual donors can fund participatory media 
networks for the underprivileged [59]. These mechanisms are 
currently untested and may provide a viable means for 
financial sustainability. A hybrid model may be the inevitable 
eventuality though, to build a combination of different revenue 
streams: Commercial advertising primarily targeted at middle 
income consumers and also able to generate a surplus for 
cross-subsidy of other user segments, donor grants targeted at 
low-income communities but with a focus on specific sectors 
only, crowd-funding for the empowerment of marginalized 
communities, and community subscriptions to support local 
action aided by the participatory media networks. 
B. To choose one path or not 
Our approach so far has been that of pragmatism to sustain 
our operations by aligning ourselves with different 
sustainability orientations, but we have also seen that it has 
constrained us in many ways, in fact drawing our focus away 
from the governance and empowerment objectives that we 
started out with. Should we choose just one of these 
approaches in a do-or-die manner? Or should we continue in 
the same pragmatic style but formalize the distinction between 
different orientations by creating subsidiary organizations? 
Each organization could be aligned towards a specific 
approach so that it can follow its respective strategy in a 
focussed manner. For example, a possible categorical 
distinction could be to have a non-profit that focuses on 
bringing change through Mobile Vaani for the underserved and 
raises grants to do this, while a separate for-profit organization 
focuses on enriching the technology stack to create new 
product lines that can be offered in a services model to social 
sector partners. Or should we look at new financial innovations 
like creating development impact bonds for media platforms? 
Although these bonds aim to shift the risk towards impact 
investors, they have also faced criticisms of measurement 
overhead, the risk of excessive narrowing down of the 
objectives to make them measurable, and also as a veiled 
attempt to financialize social services [60]. Further, applying 
this approach to media may require reliable measurement of 
media effects, which is a notoriously difficult problem to solve.  
Such questions are an intense and exciting source of 
discussion at Gram Vaani these days, as would be the case also 
with many other social enterprises trying to figure out their 
financial sustainability model. 
C. Why does the world need different kinds of enterprises? 
In the contemporary context, it increasingly seems that 
technology driven enterprises, whether explicitly for social 
good or not, seem to be evolving in a direction of social 
responsibility. Facebook started out with a strong profit-
making and growth focus without paying adequate attention to 
undesirable outcomes that emerged from its platform, and in 
the process it lost considerable social credibility. It is now 
desperately trying to reorient itself [61]. Google started with a 
motto of do no evil, and is similarly investing heavily in using 
its platforms for social good to gain both social as well as 
institutional credibility [62]. Brazen companies like Uber are 
facing a strong resistance from regulators, and have catapulted 
the rise of platform cooperatives in many parts of the world to 
counter social irresponsibility like wage-based exploitation of 
drivers, tax evasion, and compromising on the social security 
of drivers [63].  
Is the world really becoming a more responsible place by 
paying attention to ethical concerns that arise from the purely 
profit-making and shareholder value maximization 
perspectives of the firm? Floridi suggests that this may is 
happening due to the increased observability brought about as a 
result of the information age [64], although media propaganda 
and rent seeking corporate-government relationships may 
succeed in countering this [65, 76]. If this is really true though 
then distinctions for profit-based enterprises Vs non-profit 
donor funded enterprises, or whether they are doing social 
good or not, may not be necessary going forward. We may see 
existing enterprises morph into a new kind of business entity 
within which different objectives co-exist and regulatory 
processes along with checks by the employees themselves, 
ensure appropriate behavior. Some mechanisms through which 
this could be done is by having a diverse board representation 
including employee representatives for better corporate 
governance [66, 67], social audits to take into account the 
perspective of customers [68], auditing of user demographics 
and (algorithmic) outcomes to ensure unbiased participation 
among the userbase [32], profit sharing with employees to 
reduce wage inequalities [69], and with the public to reduce 
rentier effects [70], etc. In this case, there may truly just be the 
need for one kind of a business entity which promotes social 
good because there may not be any other justifiable ethical 
goal to work towards. Social enterprises may end up being the 
only form of enterprises, and the current set of social 
enterprises may have the opportunity to show the way into the 
future. We have presented such a framework of the need to 
design and manage ICT projects with a common underlying 
ethical system that is followed by the team-members of the 
project [71]. This ethical system provides crucial guidance in 
the choice of objectives to pursue, design elements to build, the 
deployment management practices, and incorporation of 
feedback from the deployment to shape the design. Ultimately 
it is the teams working on the project who need to adhere to the 
ethical system though, and we have discussed why both 
internal checks imposed by the team-members themselves on 
one another, and regulatory compliances for enterprises, can 
help ensure that undesirable outcomes do not arise.  
An alternate bleaker path that might however arise is that 
market based enterprises or even the state could masquerade as 
working towards social good, but in actuality use that as a veil 
to mask other agendas. This could result in a shirking space for 
genuine social enterprises, and this indeed is what seems to be 
happening in India as more and more large corporate groups 
are getting into the space of doing social good, with these 
spaces having been created legitimately by the government [62, 
72]. For example, with a stated goal of social good by 
improving the delivery of welfare services, the Indian state has 
practically coercively pushed the Aadhaar unique identity 
system despite documented evidence and heavy resistance of 
the civil society about the unsuitability of such technology in 
the Indian context [73, 74, 75]. Other initiatives too like Digital 
India, or the push towards a cashless economy, are all 
projected as development initiatives for social good, but 
adequate attention is not paid to undesirable outcomes that 
arise from poorly designed policy implementation [65, 76]. 
Companies like Reliance Jio or PayTM similarly wear the 
social good badge with the aiming of connecting India or 
banking the unbanked, and benefit significantly from 
government policies, but their priorities and 
inclusion/exclusion criteria are no different from that of any 
market based enterprise [77]. Another example is Whatsapp 
which has evaded any regulatory action on the problem of fake 
news, and has not undertaken any serious efforts itself to 
address the issues [78]. It seems that politicians, media, and 
companies alike, not only work together for collaborative gains 
but also paint an emancipatory and aspirational picture of 
technology, which drives rapid uptake but often leads to 
undesirable outcomes  [32, 76]. The question this raises then is 
whether democracies are strong enough for people to be able to 
shape the political economy to create institutions that can place 
checks and balances on private and public enterprises alike 
[79], to ensure that responsible outcomes arise from technology 
and social good is pursued as their only ethical goal [32, 71]? 
The answer may be negative at the moment, underscoring the 
need for both consumers of technologies and for employees 
who build and manage these technologies, to demand greater 
social responsibility from enterprises and to eventually convert 
them into social enterprises [80].  
This change we believe can only begin to happen through 
education and awareness, to understand the ethical guidelines 
within which technology based enterprises should operate and 
the goals that they should pursue [71]. We strongly feel that 
educational institutions need to cultivate capabilities for critical 
analysis among the future engineers and managers of 
enterprises about the interactions between technology and 
society [80]. Once societal foundations are stronger, we are 
confident that the world will be able to identify the right form 
that an enterprise should take so that it can create social good 
in a sustainable manner. 
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